This paper continues the study, initiated by Cole and Fleischer in [Cole and Fleischer 2008] , of the behavior of a tatonnement price update rule in Ongoing Fisher Markets. The prior work showed fast convergence toward an equilibrium when the goods satisfied the weak gross substitutes property and had bounded demand and income elasticities.
INTRODUCTION
This paper continues the investigation, begun in [Cole and Fleischer 2008; Rastogi 2008] of when a tatonnement-style price update in a dynamic market setting could lead to fast convergent behavior. This paper shows that there is a class of markets with complementary goods which enjoy fast convergence; prior results applied only to goods which are substitutes.
The impetus for this work comes from the following question: why might wellfunctioning markets be able to stay at or near equilibrium prices? This raises two issues: what are plausible price adjustment mechanisms and in what types of markets are they effective?
This question was considered in [Walras 1874] , which suggested that prices adjust by tatonnement: upward if there is too much demand and downward if too little. Since then, the study of market equilibria, their existence, stability, and their computation has received much attention in economics, operations research, and most recently in computer science. A fairly recent account of the classic perspective in economics is given in [McKenzie 2002] . The recent activity in computer science has led to a considerable number of polynomial time algorithms for finding approximate and exact equilibria in a variety of markets with divisible goods; we cite a selection of these works [Codenotti et al. 2005b [Codenotti et al. , 2006 Devanur and Vazirani 2004; Devanur and Kannan 2008; Garg and Kapoor 2004; Jain and Vazirani 2007; Orlin 2010; Vazirani 2010; Vazirani and Yannakakis 2010; Zhang 2010] . However, these algorithms do not seek to, and do not appear to provide methods that might plausibly explain these markets' behavior.
We argue here for the relevance of this question from a computer science perspective. Much justification for looking at the market problem in computer science stems from the following argument: If economic models and statements about equilibrium and convergence are to make sense as being realizable in economies, then they should be concepts that are computationally tractable. Our viewpoint is that it is not enough to show that the problems are computationally tractable; it is also necessary to show that they are tractable in a model that might capture how a market works. It seems implausible that markets with many interacting players (buyers, sellers, traders) would perform overt global computations, using global information.
Recently, a different perspective was put forward in [Echenique et al. 2011] , which argues that the fundamental question is whether computationally tractable instances of the model can fit rational data sets. But at this point, to the best of our knowledge, there are no results for the market problem.
It has long been recognized that the tatonnement price adjustment model is not fully realistic: for example, [Fisher 1972] states: "such a model of price adjustment · · · describes nobody's actual behavior." Nonetheless, there has been a continued interest in the plausibility of tatonnement, and indeed its predictive accuracy in a nonequilibrium trade setting has been shown in some experiments [Hirota et al. 2005] .
Plausibly, in many consumer markets buyers are myopic: based on the current prices, goods are assessed on a take it or leave it basis. It seems natural that this would lead to out of equilibrium trade. This is the type of setting which was studied in [Cole and Fleischer 2008] and in which we will address our main question: under what conditions can tatonnement style price updates lead to convergence? ∑ m ℓ=1 x iℓ = w i . The market problem is to find equilibrium prices. 2 The symbol * marking a variable will be used to denote the value of the variable at equilibrium. The Fisher market is a special case of the more general Exchange or Arrow-Debreu market.
While we define the market in terms of a set of buyers B, all that matters for our algorithms is the aggregate demand these buyers generate, so we will tend to focus on properties of the aggregate demand rather than properties of individual buyers' demands.
Standard notation x i = ∑ l x il is the demand for good i, and z i = x i − w i is the excess demand for good i (which can be positive or negative). s i = p i x i is the total spending on good i by all buyers. Note that while w is part of the specification of the market, x and z are functions of the vector of prices as determined by individual buyers maximizing their utility functions given their available money. We will assume that x i is a function of the prices p, that is a collection of prices induce unique demands for each good.
In order to have a realistic setting for a price adjustment algorithm, it would appear that out-of-equilibrium trade must be allowed, so as to generate the demand imbalances that then induce price adjustments. But then there needs to be a way to handle excess supply and demand. To this end, we suppose that for each good there is a warehouse which can meet excess demand and store excess supply. Each seller has a warehouse of finite capacity to enable it to cope with fluctuations in demand. It changes prices as needed to ensure its warehouse neither overfills nor runs out of goods. The Ongoing Fisher Market [Cole and Fleischer 2008] The market consists of a set G of n goods and a set B of m buyers. The seller of good i, called S i , has a warehouse of capacity κ i . As before, each buyer B ℓ has a utility function u ℓ (x 1ℓ , · · · , x nℓ ) expressing its preferences. The market repeats over an unbounded number of time intervals called days. Each day, each seller S i receives w i new units of good i, and each buyer B ℓ is given b ℓ money. Each day, B ℓ selects a maximum utility basket of goods (x 1ℓ , · · · , x nℓ ) of cost at most b ℓ . S i , for each good i, provides the demanded goods x i = ∑ m ℓ=1 x iℓ . The resulting excess demand or surplus, z i = x i − w i , is taken from or added to the warehouse stock.
Given initial prices p
the task is to repeatedly adjust prices so as to converge to equilibrium prices with the warehouse stocks converging to their ideal values; for simplicity, we suppose that v * i = κ i /2. We suppose that it is the sellers that are adjusting the prices of their goods. In order to have progress, we require them to change prices at least once a day. However, for the most part, we impose no upper bound on the frequency of price changes. This entails measuring demand on a finer scale than day units. Accordingly, we assume that each buyer spends their money at a uniform rate throughout the day. (Equivalently, this is saying that buyers with collectively identical profiles occur throughout the day, though really similar profiles suffice for our analysis.) If one supposes there is a limit to the granularity, this imposes a limit on the frequency of price changes. Notation We let v i denote the current contents of warehouse i,
Market Properties
We recall from [Cole and Fleischer 2008] that the goal of the ongoing market is to capture the distributed nature of markets and the possibly limited knowledge of individual price setters. One important aspect is that the price updates for distinct goods are allowed to occur independently and asynchronously. We refer the reader to the prior work for a more extensive discussion.
Our Contribution
As it is not possible to devise a tatonnement-style price update for general markets [Papadimitriou and Yannakakis 2010; Saari and Simon 1978; Scarf 1960] , the goal, starting in [Cole and Fleischer 2008] , has been to devise plausible constraints that enable rapid convergence. This entails devising (i) a reasonable model, (ii) a price update algorithm, (iii) a measure of closeness to equilibrium, and then (iv) analyzing the system to demonstrate fast convergence; (v) this also entails identifying appropriate constraints on the market. (i)-(iii) were addressed in [Cole and Fleischer 2008] , though there was an unsatisfactory element to the price update rule when coming close to breaching a warehouse bound (i.e. the warehouse becoming empty or full); this is fixed in the current work.
The constraints in [Cole and Fleischer 2008] were for markets of substitutes. These constraints take the form of bounds on the elasticities of demand and wealth (defined later). Curiously, the best performance occurred at the boundary between substitutes and complements (with the buyers having so-called Cobb-Douglas utilities). Despite this, the result did not extend into the complements domain. The present paper carries out such an extension, handling markets in which a mixture of complements and substitutes occur. The markets for which we show convergence again have bounded elasticities (the precise constraints are detailed later). These markets include the following scenarios.
(1) All the goods are complements. A particular instance of this setting occurs when each buyer has a CES utility with parameter ρ satisfying −1 < ρ ≤ 0 (defined later).
(2) (A generalization of (1)) The goods are partitioned into groups. Each group comprises substitutes, while the groups are complementary. A particular instance of this setting occurs when each buyer has a suitable 2-level nested CES utility [Keller 1976 ] (defined later). (3) Each buyer has a suitable arbitrary depth nested CES utility.
Overall, we believe this result significantly expands the class of markets for which the rapid convergence of tatonnement is known to hold, and thereby enhances the plausibility of tatonnement as a usable price adjustment mechanism.
There are relatively few positive results for markets of complementary goods, and to the best of our knowledge none for tatonnement algorithms. [Codenotti et al. 2005a ] gave a polynomial time algorithm based on convex programming to compute equilibrium prices for an Exchange Market in which every agent has a CES utitility with ρ in the range −1 ≤ ρ ≤ 0. [Codenotti and Varadarajan 2004 ] gave a polynomial time algorithm for Fisher markets with Leontief utilities, which was generalized in [Chen et al. 2009 ], which considered hybrid linear-Leontief utility functions, in which goods are grouped, and within a group the utilities are Leontief, and the group utilities are combined linearly.
The economics literature has many results concerning tatonnement, but the positive results largely concerned markets in which utilities satisfied weak gross substitutes, i.e. the goods were substitutes.
Finally we discuss the amortized analysis technique we introduce to handle asynchronous events. We use a potential function ϕ which satisfies two properties:
dϕ dt ≤ −Θ(κ)ϕ for a suitable parameter κ > 0 whenever there is no event. ϕ is non-increasing when an event occurs (a price update in our application).
One can then conclude that ϕ(t) ≤ e −Θ(κ)t ϕ(0), and so ϕ decreases by at least a 1 − Θ(κ) factor daily (for κ = O(1)).
It is not clear how to craft a more standard amortized analysis, in which ϕ changes only when an event occurs. The difficulty we face is that we model the warehouse imbalances as changing continuously, and it is not clear how to integrate the resulting cost with the gains from the price update events if ϕ changes only discretely.
Roadmap
In Section 2 we state the price update rules and review the definitions of elasticity. We state our main results in Section 3, then in Section 4 we provide an outline of the analysis for markets where all the goods are complementary, illustrating this with the scenario in which every buyer has a CES utility function. Finally, in Section 5, we analyze the mixed complements and substitutes scenario, illustrating it first with markets in which the buyers all have 2-level nested CES-like utilities, and then expanding the result to arbitrary levels of nesting. Some of the proofs are deferred to the full version of the paper.
PRELIMINARIES
We review the price update rule and the definitions of elasticities. The basic price update rule for the one-time market, proposed in [Cole and Fleischer 2008] , is given by
where 0 < λ ≤ 1 is a suitable parameter whose value depends on the market elasticities.
In the ongoing market, the excess demand is computed as the excess demand since the previous price change at time τ i . Thus in Equation 1, x i is replaced by the average demand since time
where t is the current time. Recall we assumed that each seller adjusts the price of its good at least once each day, so t−τ i ≤ 1.
In addition, one needs to take account of the warehouse excess, with prices dropping if there is too much stock in the warehouse, and increasing if too little. To this end, we define the target demand w i to be [Cole and Fleischer 2008] , we define the target excess demand to bē
. As it takes time for the warehouse stock to adjust as a result of a price change, it turns out that the price change needs to be proportional to the time since the last price update (this is where the price update rule differs from [Cole and Fleischer 2008] ). This yields the price update rule
where ∆t is the time since the last price update. Implicitly, the price update rule is using a linear approximation to the relationship between p i and x i . The analysis would be cleaner if the linear update were to log p i ; however, this seems a less natural update rule, and having a natural rule is a key concern when seeking to argue tatonnement could be a real process.
Next, we review the definitions of income and price elasticity.
Definition 2.1. The income elasticity of the demand for good i by a buyer with income (money) b is given by dxi db / xi b . We let γ denote the least upper bound on the income elasticities over all buyers and goods.
If all buyers are spending their budgets in full, then γ ≥ 1.
Definition 2.2. The price elasticity of the demand for good i is given by − dxi dpi / xi pi . We let α denote the greatest lower bound on the price elasticities over all goods.
In a market of complementary goods 0 ≤ α ≤ 1; in the markets we consider, α > γ/2 ≥ 1/2.
For the markets with mixed complements and substitutes we need a generalized version of elasticity, which we call the Adverse Market Elasticity. These are the extreme changes in demand that occur to one good, WLOG G 1 , when its price changes, and other prices also change but by no larger a fraction than p 1 . For suppose that p 1 were reduced with the goal of increasing x 1 . But suppose that at the same time other prices may change by the same fractional amount (either up or down). How much can this undo the desired increase in x 1 ? The answer is that in general it can more than undo it. However, our proof approach depends on x 1 increasing in this scenario, which is why we introduce this notion of elasticity and consider those markets in which it is sufficiently bounded from below.
Definition 2.3. DefineP to be the following set of prices:
We let β be a lower bound on the Adverse Market Elasticity over all goods and prices.
It is not hard to see that for the case that all the goods are complements, β ≥ 2α − γ.
OUR RESULTS

Markets with Complementary Goods
The analysis of these markets introduces the techniques needed for the more general setting. Our bounds will depend on the market parameters α and γ. It is convenient to set β = 2α − γ; note that by assumption, 0 < β ≤ 1. In addition, our bounds will depend on the initial imbalance in the prices. To specify this we define the notion of f -bounded prices.
Clearly, f (p) ≥ 1 and f (p) = 1 if and only if p = p * . When there is no ambiguity, we use f as a shorthand for f (p). We let f I denote the maximum value f takes on during the first day, which will also bound f thereafter, as we will see. It will turn out that we can assume κ i /w i are equal for all i; we denote this ratio by r.
Our results will require λ and κ to obey the following conditions.
We then show the following bound on the convergence rate.
THEOREM 3.2. Suppose that β > 0, the prices are f -bounded throughout the first day, and in addition that Equations (3)-(4) hold. Let M = ∑ j b j be the daily supply of money to all the buyers. Then the prices become
days.
We also bound the needed warehouse sizes. We say that warehouse i is safe
As we will see, the analysis of Theorem 3.2 proceeds in two phases. We need to specify some parameters relative to Phase 1. We define v(f I ) to be the total net change to v i during Phase 1. As we will see
We define D(f ) to be the duration of Phase 1 in days. As we will see,
. We will show: THEOREM 3.3. Suppose that the ratios κ i /w i are all equal. Suppose that the prices are always f -bounded. Also suppose that each price is updated at least once a day. Suppose further that initially the warehouses are all safe. Finally, suppose that Equations (3)-(4) hold. Then the warehouse stocks never either overflow or run out of stock; furthermore, after D(f ) + 32 β + 2 κ days the warehouses will be safe thereafter. 3.1.1. Example Scenario: All buyers have CES Utilities with −1 < ρ ≤ 0. We begin by reviewing the definition of CES utilities. We focus on a single buyer B ℓ , and to simplify notation, we let (y 1 , y 2 , · · · , y n ) = (x 1ℓ , x 2ℓ · · · , x nℓ ). A CES utility has the form
It is well known that when ρ ℓ ≥ 0, all goods are substitutes, and when ρ ℓ ≤ 0, all goods are complements. We will focus on the case −1 < ρ ℓ ≤ 0. It is also well known that with a budget constraint of b, the resulting demands are given by
In addition, it is easy to show that for CES utilities, γ = 1. Consequently, when ρ > −1, β > 0; it follows that the bounds from Theorems 3.2 and 3.3 apply.
Markets with Mixtures of Substitutes and Complements
To understand the constraints needed in this setting, we need to know that the analysis for markets of complements, which we adapt to the current setting, proceeds in two phases. Recall that the prices are f -bounded. In Phase 1, (f − 1) reduces multiplicatively each day. Phase 1 ends when further such reductions can no longer be guaranteed. In Phase 2, an amortized analysis shows that the misspending, roughly
Also, now that substitutes are present, we will need an upper bound on the price elasticity (see Definition 2.2), as in [Cole and Fleischer 2008] . We let E ≥ 1 denote this upper bound. For convergence we will need that λ = O(1/E).
Denote the spending on all goods which are substitutes of G 1 by S s and the spending on all goods which are complements of G 1 by S c . We need to introduce a further constraint. The reason is that the amortized analysis depends on showing the misspending decreases. However, the current constraints do not rule out the possibility that when, say p 1 is increased, the spending decrease on G 1 's complements, |∆S c |, and the spending increase on G 1 's substitutes, |∆S s |, are both larger than the reduction in misspending on G 1 . It seems quite unnatural for this to occur. We rule it out with the following assumption.
We require that β, as defined in Definition 2.3, satisfy β > 0. Our results will require λ and κ to obey the following conditions.
THEOREM 3.4. Suppose that β > 0, the prices are f -bounded throughout the first day, and Equations (5)-(6) hold. Let M = ∑ j b j be the daily supply of money to all the buyers. Then the prices become (1 + η)-bounded after
Theorem 3.3 with Equations (5)-(6) replacing Equations (3)-(4) also continues to apply.
Here
3.2.1. Example Scenario: 2-Level Nested CES Type Utilities. Keller [Keller 1976] proposed and analyzed nested CES-type utility functions, which we use to provide an example of utility functions yielding a mixture of substitutes and complements. Goods are partitioned into different groups. Two goods in the same group are substitutes, while two goods in different groups are complements.
Again, we focus on the demands (y 1ℓ , y 2ℓ , · · · , y nℓ ) of a single buyer B ℓ . For each group
The overall utility function is given by
The bounds on ρ G,ℓ and ρ ℓ are needed to allow us to show convergence; Keller allowed arbitrary values (no larger than 1). We will show that E = max G,ℓ 1 1−ρ G,ℓ and β = min ℓ 2 1−ρ ℓ − 1. The bounds from Theorems 3.4 and 3.3 will apply.
Example Scenario: N -Level Nested CES Type
Utilities. This result extends to arbitrary levels of nesting. A Nested CES Type Utility is best visualized as a utility tree. A leaf represents a good, and an internal node represents a utility component. There is a value of ρ associated with each internal node. Each utility component is of the form ( ∑ m k=1 a k u ρ k ) 1/ρ , in which u k may be the quantity of one good x k or another utility component.
We focus on one particular good i. Let A 1 , A 2 , · · · , A N be the internal nodes along the path from good i to the root of the utility tree, and let ρ 1 , ρ 2 , · · · , ρ N be the associated ρ values. Let
. We set
Again, the bounds from Theorems 3.4 and 3.3 apply. [Cole and Fleischer 2008] introduced the notion of ongoing markets and analyzed a class of ongoing Fisher markets satisfying WGS. The current work extends this analysis to classes of ongoing Fisher markets with respectively, only complementary goods, and with a mixture of complements and substitutes. The present work also handles the warehouses in the ongoing model more realistically.
Comparison to Prior Work
This entails a considerably changed analysis and some modest changes to the price update rule. As in [Cole and Fleischer 2008] , the analysis proceeds in two phases. The new analysis for Phase 1, broadly speaking, is similar to that in [Cole and Fleischer 2008] , though a new understanding was needed to extend it to the new markets. The analysis for Phase 2 is completely new. The analysis of the bounds on the warehouse sizes is also new.
A preliminary report on these techniques, applied to markets of substitutes, was given in [Cole et al. 2010] ; this manuscript included other results too (on managing with approximate values of the demands, and on extending the results to markets of indivisible goods).
THE ANALYSIS FOR COMPLEMENTARY GOODS
The largest challenge in the analysis is to handle the effect of warehouses. In [Cole and Fleischer 2008] , the price updates increased in frequency as the warehouse limits (completely full or empty) were approached, which ensured these limits were not breached. It was still a non-trivial matter to demonstrate convergence. In the present paper, the only constraint is that each price is updated at least once every full day. This seems more natural, but entails a different and new analysis.
The analysis partitions into two phases, the first one handling the situation when at least some of the prices are far from equilibrium, and for these prices, the warehouse excesses have a modest impact on the updates. This portion of the analysis is somewhat similar to the corresponding analysis in [Cole and Fleischer 2008] , except that we manage to extend it to markets including complementary goods. In the second phase, the warehouse excesses can have a significant effect. For this phase, we use a new and amortized analysis. The imbalance being measured and reduced during Phase 2 is the misspending (roughly speaking,
. It is only when prices are reasonably close to their equilibrium values that we can show the misspending decreases, which is why two phases are needed. Interestingly, in a market of substitutes, regardless of the prices, the misspending is always decreasing, so here one can carry out the whole analysis within Phase 2.
Phase 1. In Phase 1, we show that each day (f − 1) shrinks by a factor of at least 1 − Θ(λβ).
For simplicity, we begin by considering the one-time market.
Suppose that currently the prices are exactly f -bounded, and that there is a good, WLOG good G 1 , with price p 1 = p * 1 /f . We will choose the market properties to ensure that x 1 ≥ f β w 1 , regardless of the prices of the other goods, so long as they are fbounded. This ensures that the price update for p 1 will be an increase, by a factor of at least 1 + λ min{1, (f β − 1)}) . = 1 + µ. To demonstrate the lower bound on x 1 , we identify the following scenario as the one minimizing x 1 : all the complements G i of G 1 have prices f p * i . A symmetric observation applies when p 1 = f p * 1 , and then the price decreases by a factor of at least 1 − λ(1 − f −β ) . = 1 − ν. We can show that the same market properties imply that after a day of price updates every price will lie within the bounds [p * (1 + µ)/f, f p * (1 − ν) ], thereby ensuring a daily reduction of the term (f − 1) by a factor of at least 1 − Θ(λβ).
We use a similar argument for the ongoing market. First, we observe that if the price updates occurred simultaneously exactly once a day, then exactly the same bounds would apply tox i , so the rate of progress would be the same, aside the contribution of the warehouse excess to the price update. So long as this contribution is small compared to (f β −1)w 1 or to (1−f −β )w 1 , say at most half this value, then the price changes would still be by a factor of at least 1 + 1 2 λ min{1, (f β − 1)}) and 1 − 1 2 λ(1 − f −β ), respectively.
To take account of the possible variability in price update frequency, we demonstrate progress as follows: we can show that if the prices have been f -bounded for a full day, then after two more days have elapsed, the prices will have been f ′ -bounded for a full day, for (f ′ −1) = (1−Θ(λβ))(f −1). The reason we look at the f -bound over the span of a day is that the price updates are based on the average excess demand over a period of up to one day. A second issue we need to handle is that the price updates may have a variable frequency; the only guarantee is that each price is updated within one full day of its previous update. The net effect is that it takes one day to guarantee that f shrinks and hence two days for the shrinkage to have lasted at least one full day.
It follows that Phase 1 lasts O( 1 λβ log[(f I − 1)/(f II − 1)]) days, where f I is the initial value of f , and f II is its value at the start of Phase 2.
We want the following conditions to hold in Phase 2:x i , x i ≤ (2 − δ)w i and p i ≤ 2p * i . As we will see, choosing f II = min{(1 − 2δ) −1/β , (2 − δ) 1/γ } suffices. As it turns out, the calculations simplify if we also enforce that (1 − 2δ) −1/β ≤ (2 − δ) 1/γ . If 2δ/β ≤ 1 2 , then 1 + 2δ/β ≤ f II ≤ 1 + 4δ/β ≤ 2.
As already argued, the behavior of the ongoing and one-time markets are within a constant factor of each other in Phase 1 (the ongoing market progresses in cycles of two days rather than one day, and reduces (f − 1) by a factor in which λ is replaced by λ/2). So in this phase we analyze just the one-time market.
First, we state several inequalities we use. They can be proved by simple arithmetic/calculus.
Using the definitions of γ and α in Definitions 2.1 and 2.2, one can easily obtain the following lemma. 
, and all other prices are fixed, then
PROOF. We prove the first part; the second part is symmetric. By the definition of complements, x i is smallest when p j = f p * j for all j ̸ = i. Consider the situation in which p k = f p * k for all goods k. By Lemma 4.2(a),
LEMMA 4.4. Suppose that β = 2α − γ > 0. Further, suppose that the prices are updated independently using price update rule (1), where 0 < λ ≤ 1. Let p denote the current price vector and let p ′ denote the price vector after one day.
(
Similarly, suppose that
When p j is updated using price update rule (1), the new price p ′ j satisfies
Hence, after one day, a period in which each good updates its price at least once, we can guarantee that
which, by Lemma 4.1(a), is at most /(2 ln 2) . THEOREM 4.5. Suppose that β > 0, λ ≤ 1, and that the prices are initially fbounded. When δ/β ≤ 1, Phase 1 will complete within O
PROOF. Suppose that initially f > 2 1/β and 1 + 2δ/β < 2 1/β . By Lemma 4.4, after n 1 days, where n 1 satisfies the inequality f
It suffices that:
) .
If 2 1/β ≤ 1 + 2δ/β, then O( 1 λ ln f ) days suffice. After this, by Lemma 4.4, after an additional n 2 days, the market becomesa 1 + (2δ/β)-bounded, if n 2 satisfies the inequality (2 1/β ) (1−λβ/(2 ln 2)) n 2 ≤ 1 + 2δ/β. It suffices that:
The last equality holds as δ/β ≤ 1 and hence ln ln(1 + 2δ/β) = ln (δ/β) + O(1). The sum n 1 + n 2 bounds the number of days Phase 1 lasts.
Comment. If we wish to analyze the one-time market or the ongoing market without taking account of the warehouses, then arbitrarily accurate prices can be achieved in Phase 1, and the time till prices are (1 + η)-bounded, for any η is given by the bound in Theorem 4.5, on replacing the term 1 β log 1 δ by 1 β log 1 η . To apply this analysis of Phase 1 to other markets, it suffices to identify conditions that ensure x 1 ≥ f β w 1 when p 1 = p * 1 /f , and x 1 ≤ f −β when p 1 = f p * 1 . Phase 2. Once the warehouse excesses may have a large impact on the price updates, we can no longer demonstrate a smooth shrinkage of the term (f − 1). Instead, we use an amortized analysis. We associate the following potential ϕ i with good G i .
where span{t 1 , t 2 , t 3 } = max{t 1 , t 2 , t 3 }−min{t 1 , t 2 , t 3 } and 1 ≥ c 1 > 0, c 2 > 1 are suitably chosen constants. We define ϕ := ∑ i ϕ i . The term −c 1 λ(t − τ i )|x i − w i | ensures that ϕ decreases smoothly when no price update is occurring, as shown in the following lemma.
2c2 ϕ i , at any time when no price update is occuring (to any p j ).
PROOF. To simplify the presentation of this proof, let K denote κ(x i − w i ) and let S denote span(x i ,x i , w i ).
Note the following equalities: d xi d t = d wi d t = 0, d wi d t = −K and dxi d t = xi−xi t−τi . Then
Next by means of a case analysis, we show that
We show Case 1 in detail. Cases 2 and 3 are similar.
Case 1:
Case 2:
Now we use the bound from (7) to obtain the bounds on the derivatives stated in the lemma. There are two cases:
The remaining task is to show that ϕ is non-increasing when a price update occurs. This entails showing that the decrease to the term p i ·span{x i , x i , w i } is at least as large as the increase to the term p i c 2 | w i − w i | plus the value of the term p i c 1 λ(t − τ i )|x i − w i |, which gets reset to 0.
LEMMA 4.7. Let β = 2α − γ and suppose that β > 0 and the following conditions hold:
)
. Then, when a price p i is updated using rule (2), the value of ϕ stays the same or decreases.
If δ and λ are small, thenᾱ = (2 − 2α) 1) . The third condition is then satisfied by having λ = O(1). More precise bounds are given later.
To demonstrate a continued convergence of the prices during Phase 2, we need to relate the prices to the potential ϕ. We show the following bound.
THEOREM 4.8. Suppose that the conditions in Lemmas 4.6 and 4.7 hold. Let M = ∑ j b j be the daily supply of money to all the buyers. Then, in Phase 2, the prices become
Once ϕ has shrunk to η min i p * i w i , we know that all prices are (1 + η)-bounded. Finally, Lemmas 4.6 and 4.7 imply that ϕ shrinks by a (1 − Θ(κ)) factor each day.
If the updates in Phase 2 start with an initial value for the potential of ϕ I ≪ M , then in the bound on the number of days one can replace M with ϕ I .
Summing the bounds from Theorems 4.5 (note that δ ≤ β) and 4.8, yields Theorem 3.2, modulo showing that Equations (3)-(4) suffice to ensure the conditions in Theorems 4.5 and 4.8.
Bounds on the Warehouse Sizes
Phase 1. Recall that f I is the initial value of f . Define d(f ) = max i x i /w i when the prices are f -bounded. In a market of complementary goods, d(f ) ≤ f γ . We can show: LEMMA 4.9. In Phase 1, the total net change to v i is bounded by
A simple bound on the extra warehouse capacity needed for Phase 2, based on its duration, leads to a need for capacity κ = Ω(w i /κ). But we already required that κ|v i − v * i | ≤ δw i , i.e. κκ i /2 ≤ δw i , and these two requirements are not compatible. Instead, we observe that in Phase 2 the price adjustments are always strictly within the bounds of 1 ± λ∆t, where ∆t is the time since the previous update to p i . If v i ≤ κ i /2 − bw i , then an update of p i by a factor 1 − λµ∆t, implies that w i −x i ≥ (µw i + κbw i )∆t, and (w i −x i )∆t is exactly the amount by which v i decreases between these two price updates. As the prices are ((1 − 2δ) −β )-bounded, the difference between the price increases and decreases is bounded, and consequently, over time the change to the warehouse stock will be dominated by the sum of the κbw i ∆t terms. This is made precise in the following lemma (an analogous result applies if v i ≥ κ i /2 + bw i ).
LEMMA 4.10. Let a 1 , a 2 , k > 0. Suppose that v i ≤ v * i − a 1 w i and that κa 1 ≥ 4λ 2 . Let τ be the time of a price update of p i to p i,1 . Suppose that henceforth p i ≤ ef p i,1 for somē f ≥ 0. If k ≥ 2 κa1 (f +a 2 ), then by time τ +(k +1) the warehouse stock will have increased to more than v * i − a 1 w i , or by at least a 2 w i , whichever is the lesser increase. PROOF. Suppose that v i ≤ v * i − a 1 w i throughout (or the result holds trivially). Each price change by a multiplicative (1 + µ∆t) is associated with a target excess
, where z i = µw i . Furthermore, the increase to the warehouse stock since the previous price update is exactly −(
Thus 1 + µ∆t ≥ e µ∆t−2λ 2 ∆t (recall that all price changes are bounded by 1 ± λ∆t).
Suppose that over the next k days there are l − 1 price changes; let the next l price changes be by 1 + µ 1 ∆t 1 , 1 + µ 2 ∆t 2 , · · · , 1 + µ l ∆t l . Note that the total price change satisfies ef
We conclude that when the l-th price change occurs, the warehouse stock will have increased by at least
, then the warehouse stock increases by at least a 2 w i .
Comment.
The relationship between the change in capacity and the size of the price update is crucial in proving this lemma, and this depends on having the factor ∆t in the price update rule.
To complete the analysis of Phase 2, we view each warehouse as having 8 equal sized zones of fullness, with the goal being to bring the warehouse into its central four zones. The role of the outer zones is to provide a buffer to cope with initial price imbalances.
Definition 4.11. The four zones above the half way target are called the high zones, and the other four are the low zones. Going from the center outward, the zones are called the central zone, the inner buffer, the middle buffer, and the outer buffer. The warehouse is said to be safe if it is in one of its central zones or one of its inner buffers.
Let D(f I ) bound the duration of Phase 1 and let v(f I ) be chosen so that v(f I )w i bounds the change to v i , for all i, during Phase 1. We gave a bound on v(f I ) in Lemma 4.9.
We will assume that the ratios κ i /w i are all the same, i.e. that every warehouse can store the same maximum number of days supply. This will be without loss of generality, for if the smallest warehouse can store only 2d days supply, Theorem 3.3 in effect shows that every warehouse remains with a stock within dw i of κ i /2. An alternative approach is to suppose that each seller S i has a separate parameter κ i (replacing κ). The only effect on the analysis is that the convergence rate is now controlled by κ = min i κ i .
To prove Theorem 3.3 it will suffice that the following conditions hold. for all i:
32wi . Comment. We note that were the price update rule to have the form p ′ i ← p i e λ min{1,z/wi}∆t rather than p ′ i ← p i (1 + λ min{1,z/w i }∆t) then Constraint (3) in Theorem 3.3 would not be needed (this constraint comes from setting a 1 in Lemma 4.10 to the width of a zone). We call this alternate rule the exponential price update rule. However, we prefer the form of the rule we have specified as it strikes us as being simpler and hence more natural.
Condition Summary
Lemma 4.7 and Theorem 3.3 require several constraints on the parameters κ, δ, λ, c 1 , c 2 . We can unwind these conditions to show how these parameters depend on the market parameters α, γ and β.
Let r = κ i /w i . Then the conditions can be satisfied when Equations (3) and (4) hold. Note that r needs to be sufficiently large, or in other words for every i, κ i needs to be sufficiently large, to ensure that there is a choice of λ which satisfies both the upper and lower bounds. Further note that the term √ κτ 32 , which is due to Constraint (3), would not be needed were we to use the exponential price update rule.
MARKETS WITH MIXTURES OF SUBSTITUTES AND COMPLEMENTS
For the markets with mixtures of substitutes and complements, we defined Adverse Market Elasticity and made Assumption 1 in Section 3.2. Note that for the case that all the goods are complements, β as defined in Definition 2.3 equals 2α − γ.
We can then show that Theorem 4.5 applies here too. We can also show the following results, analogs of Lemma 4.7, and Theorems 4.8 and 3.2.
LEMMA 5.1. Suppose Assumption 1 holds and β, as defined in Definition 2.3, satisfies β > 0. Suppose that the following conditions hold:
(1) f ≤ (1 − 2δ) −1/β ≤ (2 − δ) 1/(2E−β) since the last price update to p i ;
(2) 2α ′ (1 − 2δ) −(2E−β)/β + c 1 + c 2 δ ≤ 1 − δ;
where α ′′ := α ′ + 2(E − 1). Then, when a price p i is updated using rule (2), the value of ϕ stays the same or decreases.
THEOREM 5.2. Suppose that the conditions in Lemmas 4.6 and 5.1 hold. Let M = ∑ j b j be the daily supply of money to all the buyers. Then, in Phase 2, the prices become
Theorem 3.4 follows on summing the bounds from Theorems 4.5 and 5.2, and on showing that Equations (3)-(4) imply the constraints in Lemmas 4.6 and 5.1. Theorem 3.3 also continues to apply unchanged. Here d(f ) ≤ f 2E−β .
Example Scenario: 2-Level Nested CES Type Utilities
We will use index i to denote a good, G i to denote the group containing good i, index j to a denote a good in G i (but not good i) and index k to denote a good in a group other than G i . Denote the spending on all the goods in the group G i by s Gi and the total income of the buyer by b. Keller [Keller 1976 ] derived the following formulae:
As 1 As ρ < 0, ∂s k ∂p i < 0, which is equivalent to ∂x k ∂p i < 0; i.e. two goods in different groups are complements.
To compute β, we note that when p i changes by a factor t, the smallest change in demand occurs if the prices for its substitutes, namely, the goods in its group, all also change by t, while the prices for its complements, namely all the other goods, change by a factor 1/t. As ρ < 0, ∂xi/∂pi xi/pi + ∑ j∈G,j̸ =i ∂xi/∂pj xi/pj
When the prices of all goods are raised by a factor t > 1 and then the prices of all goods in G are reduced by a factor 1/t 2 , x ′ i ≥ x i t 2/(1−ρ)−1 ; when the prices of all goods are reduced by a factor t < 1 and then the prices of all goods in G are raised by a factor 1/t 2 , x ′ i ≤ x i t 2/(1−ρ)−1 . Thus β = 2 1−ρ − 1. Finally, note that ∑
Thus Assumption 1 is satisfied with α ′ = −ρ 1−ρ (1 − λ) −E . Hence the bounds from Theorems 3.4 and 3.3 apply.
